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I. Introduction 
The rural sector has featured prominently in China’s policy agenda since the change 
in leadership in the early 2000s.  For each of the seven consecutive years from 2004 
through 2010 the State Council’s No. 1 Central Document addressed rural policies.  
As the first policy communiqué of the year, these documents are indicative of the high 
priority placed on the rural sector (Xinhua 2008, 2010), and they have introduced an 
array of policy initiatives, such as the “New Socialist Countryside” program.  
 Key rural policies during this period have included the elimination of agricultural 
taxes and fees, government subsidies for agricultural production, public investments 
in rural infrastructure, extension of the minimum living guarantee (dibao) program to 
rural areas, the rural cooperative medical system, and the expansion of universal, free 
nine-year public education (Chen 2009, 2010; Lin and Wong 2012).  In addition, the 
government has implemented measures to ease restrictions on rural-urban mobility 
and to improve work and living conditions for migrants (Cai, Du, and Wang 2009).      
The recent emphasis on the rural sector reflects two national concerns: the 
widening gap between urban and rural incomes and the slow growth of agricultural 
production. The growing gap between urban and rural incomes has been noted in 
numerous studies and has been a major factor contributing to the secular increase in 
income inequality (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008; Chapter 2 in this volume).  The 
welfare of the rural population has lagged behind that of the urban population, not 
only in terms of income but also in other areas, such as health, education, and social 
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support (Whyte 2010).  
Agricultural production has experienced ups and downs, with implications for 
both the supply of food and rural incomes. Trends in grain output, of particular 
concern to the central government, are indicative. After reaching peak levels in 
1998-99, China’s grain production fell markedly and in 2003 was at its lowest level in 
more than a decade.  This drop was associated with declining prices for key farm 
products, to some extent a byproduct of the trade liberalization leading up to and 
following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Huang 
et al. 2007).  These price trends affected growth in rural household earnings from 
agriculture, a major source of income for rural households (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 
2005; Khan and Riskin 2008).        
 In this chapter we document changes in rural household incomes and inequality 
from 2002 to 2007, a period of renewed emphasis on rural policy.  We use data from 
the 2002 and 2007 CHIP rural household surveys, and make comparisons to findings 
reported in studies based on previous rounds of the CHIP rural survey.   
 We begin by examining changes in the level of per capita household income.  As 
noted in other chapters in this volume, between 2002 and 2007 China’s urban-rural 
income gap widened.  Was this expansion of the urban-rural gap the result of 
stagnation in rural household incomes?  Our answer is no.  We find that rural 
incomes grew substantially, and at a more rapid pace than during the preceding period.  
Moreover, this income growth was relatively balanced, reflecting increases in income 
from both agriculture and off-farm employment and other sources.  Therefore, the 
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widening of the urban-rural income gap between 2002 and 2007 was the result of 
even more rapid growth in urban incomes, rather than the result of stagnation in rural 
incomes. 
  Second, we analyze changes in inequality within the rural areas. China’s 
countryside is large and diverse, characterized by differing economic conditions and 
opportunities.  Some policies have targeted poorer rural areas and groups; others 
have not.  We find that, on balance, rural inequality increased only slightly during 
this period.  The lack of deterioration in inequality reflects the fact that rural income 
growth during this period was widely shared.     
Third, we analyze changes in rural poverty.  As measured against an absolute 
poverty line, the poverty rate and poverty gap declined substantially.  We find, 
however, that for the remaining poor, extreme poverty has increased.  In addition, we 
find no improvement in relative poverty, as measured in relation to median income 
rather than an absolute poverty line.       
 How do these trends in income and poverty relate to recent rural policies?  
Although a full analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, we use 
available information in the CHIP datasets to investigate the impact of several key 
policies.  In the sections that follow we examine the distribution of income from 
migrant employment, the effects of reductions in government taxes and fees, and the 
relationship between poverty and participation in the dibao program.   
 
II. Data and Methods 
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In our analysis we use the 2002 and 2007 CHIP rural household survey data.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1 and the appendices to this volume, the rural survey samples 
include household members with rural hukou who are short-term migrants and also 
longer-term migrants who maintain close ties with their rural households of origin.  
In 2007 the CHIP rural survey covered 16 provinces, 13,000 households, and 51,847 
individuals. The 2002 CHIP covered fewer households and individuals, but more 
provinces—9,200 households and 37,969 individuals from 22 provinces.  Fifteen 
provinces (Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu) were covered in both 
years, seven provinces (Jilin, Jiangxi, Shandong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and 
Xinjiang) only in 2002, and one (Fujian) only in 2007.  Some incomplete and 
missing data slightly reduce the number of observations used in our analyses. 
 In our calculations we include all provinces for both years. Except where noted 
otherwise, all calculations are done using two-level regional and provincial weights; 
consequently, the results should be nationally representative for both years despite the 
coverage of different provinces.1  We note that the weighting approach used here 
improves upon that used in earlier analyses of the CHIP rural data.   
 For growth across the two years, we report results calculated in constant prices 
using the national rural consumer price index compiled by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS).  In some calculations we also adjust for differences in the cost of 
living among the provinces, using the price indices from Brandt and Holz (2006) and 
extended to 2007 using the annual provincial rural consumer price indices from the 
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NBS. We refer to estimates adjusted for differences in provincial costs of living as 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates. 
As mentioned in other chapters, two income definitions are commonly used in 
analyses of China’s income distribution.  One is the NBS measure of household per 
capita net income.  The other is a broader measure of household per capita net 
income that is used in the earlier CHIP studies (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008; 
Khan and Riskin 1998; Khan et al. 1992).  The main difference between these two 
measures is that the latter includes imputed rents on owner-occupied housing and, 
compared to the former, has a fuller accounting of income subsidies.  In the context 
of the rural sector where households have received few subsidies, the major difference 
between these two income measures is imputed rent.  Our measure of income in this 
chapter is equal to NBS income plus the imputed rent; below we refer to this as 
“CHIP income.”  Our estimates of imputed rents are taken Chapter 3 of this volume.  
For purposes of comparison, we present some results for both the NBS and CHIP 
measures of income. 
 
III. Trends in Rural Incomes 
Table 5.1 shows the mean values of income per capita calculated using the CHIP rural 
survey data.  Overall, these income levels are consistent with the published NBS 
statistics on rural incomes based on its annual rural household surveys.  If we use the 
NBS definition of income, in both years the weighted mean incomes calculated using 
the CHIP rural survey data are higher than, but within 5 percent of, the published NBS 
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figures.  The CHIP data also yield growth rates in real per capita income, measured 
using the NBS definition of income, that are lower than but close to those published 
by the NBS.  Including imputed rents increases the level of per capita income and 
also the rate of income growth.  Hereafter, we carry out our analysis using the CHIP 
income definition, except where otherwise noted.   
[insert Table 5.1 about here] 
The estimates in Table 5.1 show that real growth in rural incomes between 2002 
and 2007 was fairly rapid, averaging 7.4 percent annually.  Much of this income 
growth was due to increased earnings from agriculture and migrant employment.  
Table 5.2 shows the composition of income during the two years.  By 2007 wage 
income, including that from both migrant and local employment, accounted for 38 
percent of per capita rural household income.  Wage earnings from migrant work 
increased very rapidly -- at 17 percent per year.  Wage earnings from local 
employment increased more slowly at 3 percent a year.   
 In 2007 agriculture contributed 37 percent of income.  Although the share of 
agriculture to total income declined slightly from 2002, agricultural income 
nevertheless showed solid growth of 6 percent per year, rebounding from slow growth 
of only 1.2 percent per year between 1995 and 2002 (Khan and Riskin 2008, p. 63).  
Moreover, in absolute terms agriculture contributed nearly one-third of the overall 
income increment between 2002 and 2007 (the last two columns of Table 5.2).   
These positive trends in agricultural income are consistent with the 
pro-agriculture policies adopted at the time.  The CHIP data do not allow us to 
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distinguish the effects of new agricultural support policies from other factors, such as 
improved farm prices and technical change, but information from other sources allows 
us to make a rough calculation.  Lin and Wong (2012) provide data on government 
agricultural support subsidies, from which we calculate that direct production 
subsidies were equal to 11 yuan of household agricultural income per capita in 2003 
and 57 yuan in 2007.  These numbers suggest that receipts of farm production 
subsidies contributed roughly 57 yuan, or 10 percent, of the 587 yuan increase in 
nominal farm income between 2002 and 2007.  We conclude that although 
government agricultural production subsidies were not trivial, they explain only a 
small fraction of the increase in rural household agricultural income during this 
period. 
Income from household nonagricultural businesses, transfers, and property all 
grew to greater or lesser extents.  As a share of total income, earnings from 
nonagricultural businesses declined slightly, whereas asset income and imputed rents 
on owner-occupied housing increased.  By 2007 income from these two latter 
sources accounted for 11 percent of total income, signaling the emergence of assets as 
a significant component of income in rural China.   
[insert Table 5.2 about here] 
Net transfer income, which includes public transfers such as dibao and wubao 
support, net of taxes, as well as private transfers such as gifts and migrant remittances, 
increased in absolute terms, as one might expect given the new subsidy programs and 
the reductions in taxes and fees at the time.  Still, they remained a relatively small 
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component of total income.  We note that some government programs that were 
adopted in the 2000s operated indirectly by reducing household outlays on education, 
health, and production, or by increasing net income from farming, rather than 
explicitly through “transfer” income.  
 
IV. Trends in Rural Inequality 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show our estimates of rural inequality in 2002 and 2007.  Table 
5.3 reports estimates of the Gini coefficient calculated with and without imputed rents 
from owner-occupied housing.  Our estimates of the Gini calculated using the NBS 
income definition (excluding imputed rents), shown in the last row of Table 5.3, are 
similar to those published by the NBS.  For both years these two Gini estimates 
differ by less than 3 percent.  In both cases the Gini coefficients increased between 
2002 and 2007.  The increase is larger for the official NBS statistics but is still 
modest, i.e., less than 3 percent.   
 Including imputed rents slightly reduces inequality and also slightly reduces the 
change in inequality.  The mildly equalizing effect of imputed rents reflects their 
relatively equal distribution due to almost universal homeownership in rural China 
(see Chapter 3).  
 Spatial differences in the cost of living have led to an overstatement of measured 
inequality for China as a whole (Brandt and Holz 2006; Sicular et al. 2007).  We 
therefore present estimates of the rural Gini coefficient after adjusting for the spatial 
price differences.  Estimates of PPP inequality are shown in the last three columns of 
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Table 5.3.  We find that the PPP adjustment has a trivial effect on the measured 
levels of rural inequality and that the change in the Gini between 2002 and 2007 
remains modest.  We conclude that costs of living differences within the rural sector 
are not important to our analysis. Consequently, hereafter we do not adjust for spatial 
price differences. 
[insert Table 5.3 about here] 
Our preferred estimates of the Gini, calculated using the CHIP income definition, 
show little change in inequality over the two years: 0.354 for 2002 and 0.358 for 2007.  
We conclude that inequality in rural China remained low and relatively stable 
throughout this period.  Even the highest estimates in Table 5.3 are well below 0.4, 
and changes in the level of inequality for all estimates between 2002 and 2007 are 
modest.  
[insert Table 5.4 about here]  
Alternate inequality indices yield similar findings (Table 5.4). The Coefficient of 
Variation, Theil index, and Mean Log Deviation increase only slightly between 2002 
and 2007.   
 Table 5.4 also shows estimates of the range, calculated as the ratio of the mean 
incomes of the richest and poorest groups in the income distribution.  The range 
shows more change between 2002 and 2007 than the other inequality indices, and the 
change is greater when the cutoffs for the top and bottom income groups are more 
extreme.  The range for the top 20 percent versus the bottom 20 percent increased 4 
percent, whereas that for the top 5 percent versus the bottom 5 percent increased a 
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marked 25 percent.  In 2002 the richest 5 percent of rural households enjoyed sixteen 
times, and in 2007 twenty times, the per capita income of the poorest 5 percent of 
rural households.  Thus, although inequality overall was relatively stable, the gap 
between the very low and very high extremes widened.     
An examination of income growth for each decile group in the income 
distribution provides more detailed information about the changes in income 
distribution (Figure 5.1).  Except for the poorest decile group, income growth 
between 2002 and 2007 was in the 7 to 8 percent range.  Income growth lagged, 
however, for the poorest decile, which grew at a slower rate of 5 percent.   
[insert Figure 5.1 around here] 
To explore the contribution of the different income sources to inequality, we 
decompose the Gini coefficient by its source components (Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki 
1986; Adams 1999).  If the total income is composed of k components, that is, 
, then the Gini coefficient of total income G(Y) can be expressed as the 
sum of the contributions Sk of each income source 
       (1) 
Here  is the share of source k income in total income, G(Yk) is the Gini 
coefficient measured over income from source k, and Rk is the rank correlation 
between income from source k and total income, that is,  
                    (2) 
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where F(.) is the cumulative distribution of total household income or income from 
source k in the sample.2  
The share of income component k in total inequality can then be written as 
        (3)   
In equation (3) ck, the relative concentration coefficient, is of particular interest, as it 
indicates whether an income source is inequality-increasing or inequality-decreasing. 
A value of ck greater than one indicates that income from this source is 
inequality-increasing; a value of less than one indicates that it is 
inequality-decreasing.   
 Table 5.5 provides estimates of ck (in the middle two columns) and of sk (in the 
last two columns).  These estimates reveal how different sources of income affected 
overall inequality in rural China.  Agriculture, with the lowest relative concentration 
coefficient in both years, remained the most equalizing income component.  The rise 
in agriculture’s ck between 2002 and 2007 implies that the extent to which agriculture 
was equalizing declined.  Incomes from migrant wages and imputed rent on 
owner-occupied housing were also equalizing.   
 Net transfer income was dis-equalizing in 2002, but by 2007 it had become less 
so, possibly reflecting the elimination of taxes and fees as well as government 
transfers to poorer households.  Since we cannot separate public from private 
transfers, and since government subsidies for agriculture enter income through their 
influence on net income from agriculture, changes in the distribution of net transfer 
income do not fully capture the effects of such policies on inequality. 
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The remaining sources of income -- income from nonagricultural household 
businesses and asset income -- were dis-equalizing in 2002.  Between 2002 and 2007 
household business income became more, and asset income less, dis-equalizing.  In 
2007 asset income had a neutral impact.        
[insert Table 5.5 about here] 
The last two columns in Table 5.5 show the contributions of different sources of 
income to overall inequality.  The size of the contribution depends on both the 
relative concentration coefficient ck and the share of income uk.  In 2007 agriculture 
contributed about a quarter of total inequality, a slight increase from 2002.  This 
large contribution reflects agriculture’s substantial share of total income.   
 Wage earnings from local employment also contributed about a quarter of overall 
inequality in 2007.  This was a substantial drop from 2002, when local wages 
contributed more than one-third of the inequality.  The contribution of wages from 
migrant employment was relatively low in both years, reflecting its fairly equal 
distribution.  Its contribution increased substantially between 2002 and 2007, 
however, this was due to its increased share of household income.   
The combined contributions of asset income and imputed rent on owner-occupied 
housing grew from 10.9 percent in 2002 to 12.3 percent in 2007.  Thus the 
importance of income from property to rural inequality showed a modest increase and 
constituted a nontrivial share of overall inequality in the rural sector.   
 
V. Changes in Rural Poverty 
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During China’s economic transition poverty in rural China declined dramatically. 
According to the NBS, in 2007 the rural poverty rate was only 1.6 percent, down from 
30.7 percent in 1978 (Department of Rural Surveys 2008).  These trends are 
measured using China’s official poverty lines, which many observers believe to be 
low (e.g., Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division 2009).  Using a 
higher poverty line yields a higher poverty rate, but it does not change the conclusion 
that in recent decades rural China has witnessed substantial poverty reduction 
(Ravallion and Chen 2007; Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division 
2009).  
 In view of the various poverty lines used in the literature, we present several  
estimates, two using absolute poverty lines and two using relative poverty lines.  In 
all cases we use the NBS measure of income, which does not include imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing.  Imputed rents are excluded because the official poverty 
lines are set without reference to imputed rents as a cost of living; therefore, including 
them would artificially reduce the poverty rates.   
Our first absolute poverty line is the widely used international purchasing power 
parity (PPP) poverty threshold of PPP$1.25 per day per person, which we convert to 
yuan using the recently updated PPP exchange rate of 3.46 yuan to the US dollar in 
2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008).  The second is the Chinese government’s official 
poverty line. In view of past criticisms of the official poverty line, we use the new, 
higher 2008 official poverty line of 1196 yuan. We adjust both of these poverty lines 
to their 2002 and 2007 levels using the NBS rural consumer price index.  
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Relative poverty lines are commonly applied for measurements of poverty in 
higher-income countries, where few households experience absolute deprivation but 
where individuals at the lower end of the income distribution nevertheless may be 
disadvantaged (Osberg 2000; Ravallion 1992).  In view of China’s rapid growth over 
the past decades, we believe the concept of relative poverty is increasingly relevant.  
Following common practice in the literature, we use a relative poverty line equal to 50 
percent of the median income and also a second, higher relative poverty line of 60 
percent of the median income.  Median income is calculated using the weighted rural 
CHIP sample incomes for each of the two years.   
 Table 5.6 shows our four poverty lines.  Due to growth in rural incomes between 
2002 and 2007, the ratio of the absolute poverty lines to the mean sample income fell.  
For the relative poverty lines, the ratios remained constant.  
[insert Table 5.6 about here] 
Using these poverty lines we calculate the level of poverty.  Consistent with the 
literature, we adopt the approach developed by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984), 
which yields the common poverty headcount as well as estimates of the poverty gap.  
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index can be written as 
        (4) 
where N is the size of the total population, q is the size of the poor population, z is the 
poverty line, and Yi is the income of individual i.  This index calculates the poverty 
gap i ig z Y= −  for each individual under the poverty line, which is then divided by the 
level of the poverty line and raised to the powerα . The parameter α  can be 
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interpreted as the degree of poverty aversion: the larger theα , the greater the degree 
of poverty aversion.   
 Conveniently, when α =0, FGT(0) is simply the headcount ratio (the proportion 
of the population that is poor).  FGT(1) gives the average poverty gap, which 
measures the average percentage income shortfall below the poverty line of the poor.  
FGT(2) is the squared poverty gap, which places more weight on the income shortfall 
of the extreme poor than that of the near-poor who are close to the poverty line.  
These three poverty measures capture the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty, 
respectively (Ravallion 2004). 
Table 5.7 shows estimates of these three poverty measures calculated for each of 
the alternative poverty lines.  The level of poverty and the change in poverty 
between 2002 and 2007 differ depending on the choice of the poverty line.  For the 
absolute poverty lines, the poverty headcount declines substantially between 2002 and 
2007: for the PPP$1.25 per day poverty line, the poverty headcount FGT(0) drops by 
more than half, from 27 percent to 14 percent, and for the official poverty line, the 
headcount declines from 11 percent to 6 percent.   
[insert Table 5.7 about here] 
For the relative poverty lines, the poverty headcount remains almost unchanged 
between 2002 and 2007.  For example, relative to 50 percent of the median income 
the poverty headcount increased slightly from 13.7 to 14.3 percent.  This suggests 
that although the income of the poor grew enough between 2002 and 2007 to raise 
roughly half of the poor above absolute poverty, this income growth was not sufficient 
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to catch up with the median income.   
 Results for the poverty gap FGT(1) also differ between the absolute and relative 
poverty lines.  For the former, the poverty gap decreased between 2002 and 2007, 
and for the latter it increased.  Results for the squared poverty gap are consistent for 
the four poverty lines: in all cases, the severity of poverty as measured by FGT(2) 
increased.  These findings suggest that between 2002 and 2007 the near-poor—those 
near the absolute poverty lines—saw income growth and escaped poverty, but the 
incomes of the extreme poor lagged.  Consequently, the remaining poor in 2007 can 
be characterized by a greater degree of severe poverty. 
To what extent do these poverty trends reflect the results of income growth rather 
than redistribution between richer and poorer groups?  As noted above, on average 
rural incomes grew substantially between 2002 and 2007.  Did this rising tide raise 
the boats of the poor?  Two methods commonly used to differentiate between the 
impact of growth as opposed to redistribution are those of Datt and Ravallion (1992) 
and Shorrocks (1999).  We have used both methods, which yield similar results, so 
here we report only the results of the Shorrocks approach.   
 The level of poverty P is determined by the poverty line z, the mean income , 
and the cumulative distribution of income as measured by the Lorenz curve L(p), 
which gives the share of income going to the bottom p percent of the population.  
Let the subscript t denote time.  Then, the change in the level of poverty from time 0 
to time t can be expressed as 
     (5) 
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According to Shorrocks (1999), the change in the level of poverty can be decomposed 
into the growth effect (G) and the redistribution effect (R) as follows:   
   (6a) 
   (6b) 
The growth effect G (6a) is calculated as the change in poverty that results from 
the observed change in mean income, holding the distribution and poverty line 
constant.  The redistribution effect R (6b) is calculated as the change in poverty that 
results from the observed change in the distribution of income, holding the mean 
income and the poverty line constant.  In both cases, the effects are calculated as the 
average of the values obtained from holding the other variables constant at their 2002 
and 2007 values. 
[insert Table 6.8 around here] 
Table 5.8 reports the results of the decomposition calculated using the two 
absolute poverty lines.  In all but one case income growth reduced poverty.  The 
largest effect of growth was on the poverty headcount.  Indeed, the measured 
reduction in China’s rural poverty headcount was due entirely to income growth.  In 
contrast, in all cases redistribution increased poverty, although for the poverty 
headcount and the poverty gap the effect was relatively small.  For the squared 
poverty gap FGT(2) the redistribution effect increased poverty and was the primary 
reason for the increases in this measure of poverty.   
 These findings reveal the importance of across-the-board income growth for 
reductions in the number of rural poor and the poverty gap.  Growth alone, however, 
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has not been sufficient to reduce the severity of poverty as measured by the squared 
poverty gap.  The fact that redistribution in all cases has been poverty-increasing 
indicates that recent government transfer programs meant to benefit lower income 
areas and households have not, on balance, been sufficient to generate a 
poverty-reducing redistribution of income between higher and lower income groups. 
The structure of income differs between the poor and the non-poor.  Tables 5.9 
and 5.10 show the composition of income for these two groups in 2002 and 2007, 
calculated using the PPP$1.25 per day poverty line.  In both years agriculture 
remained the most important source of income for the poor.  The poor received a 
large but declining share of their income from agriculture—61 percent in 2002 and 54 
percent in 2007.  In comparison, the non-poor received about 40 percent of their 
income from agriculture in both years.   
 For the non-poor, wage earnings were as important as agricultural income and in 
both years contributed roughly 40 percent of income.  Furthermore, for the non-poor 
wages from local employment were more important than wages from migrant work, 
although the gap between these two types of wage income shrank in 2007.  For the 
poor, wages were a less important, although still significant, source of income, 
contributing 29 percent of income in 2002 and 34 percent in 2007.  Nearly half of 
the wage income of the poor was from migrant employment, which suggests either 
that the poor tend to live in areas with fewer local job opportunities than the areas 
where the non-poor live, or that they do not fare as well in local job markets.   
[insert Table 5.9 about here] 
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Nonagricultural businesses were a significant source of income for the non-poor, 
but contributed a small and declining share of income for the poor.  Net transfer 
income was relatively small for both groups, although for the poor it increased from 4 
percent of income in 2002 to 7 percent in 2007.  This may reflect the impact of the 
dibao program (see Section VIII below).  Income from assets increased for both the 
non-poor and the poor, but remained a relatively small share of income.  Since our 
poverty calculations are done using the NBS income definition, the breakdown of 
income shown in Table 5.9 does not include imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing. 
[insert Table 5.10 about here] 
Table 5.10 provides additional information about the difference in income 
between poor and non-poor households.  In both 2002 and 2007 wage earnings, 
including those from local and migrant employment, accounted for more than 40 
percent of the difference in income between these two groups.  The importance of 
migrant wages increased, whereas that of wages from local jobs declined.  
Agricultural income contributed more than 30 percent of the income difference.  
Income from transfers and assets accounted for relatively small portions of the income 
gap. 
  
VI. Migration and Rural Incomes 
China’s economic reforms have led to an ongoing and substantial flow of rural 
workers seeking migrant work in the cities.  Although migration was already 
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substantial before the change in leadership in the early 2000s, policies adopted since 
2000 have more actively supported rural migration.  Central government policies 
include programs to improve employment and living conditions for migrants, as well 
as some loosening of the household registration (hukou) regulations (Cai, Du, and 
Wang 2009).   
 With these policy measures has come growth in the number of migrants.  As 
depicted in Figure 5.1, by 2006 the number of migrants reached about 130 million, 
equivalent to 26 percent of the rural labor force and up from about 50 million (less 
than 15 percent of the rural labor force) in 1999 (Sheng 2008).      
[insert Figure 5.1 about here] 
 There are different ways to explore the effects of migration on rural incomes, 
inequality, and poverty, and there are also different criteria for identifying migrants, 
including, for example, by workplace, time outside the household, and so forth.  
Here our focus is on the level and distribution of rural household per capita incomes, 
and we are concerned with that portion of rural household income that is derived from 
migrant work by members of rural households.  We use data in the CHIP surveys on 
household labor earnings from migrant employment to identify households that 
engage in migration.  Households that report labor earnings from migrant 
employment are identified as migrant households; households with zero labor 
earnings from migrant labor are identified as non-migrant households. This approach 
differs somewhat from that used in other studies, many of which examine individuals. 
Income in the CHIP data includes several types of income derived from migration:  
 
 
354
wage earnings from migrant employment by current household members, remittances 
from family and relatives who are not members of the household, and income from 
household nonagricultural businesses that operate in a location different from the 
place of residence.  Unfortunately, we cannot identify the latter two types of income, 
as they are not reported separately in the CHIP data.  Remittances are included in 
transfer income, and business income earned in a location away from the place of 
residence is included in nonagricultural business income.  The CHIP data do provide 
information on wage earnings from migrant employment of current household 
members.  By 2007 wage earnings from migrant jobs held by current household 
members exceeded the sum of total transfers and nonagricultural business income (see 
Table 5.2).  Thus, even though we do not know exactly the amount of the 
remittances and business income earned in other locations, we do know that by 2007 
they were less important for rural households than wages from migrant jobs.  
 As discussed above, the CHIP data clearly show the growing importance of 
income from migrant employment between 2002 and 2007, especially for non-poor 
households.  Moreover, this source of income remained equalizing in both years. 
 Figures 5.2 and 5.3 provide additional information about the distribution of 
migrant wages and employment.  Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of households that 
reported wage earnings from migration, by decile of the distribution of income.  
These percentages can be interpreted as household participation rates in migrant 
employment.  In 2002 33 percent of rural households participated in migrant 
employment.  By 2007, participation rose by 10 percentage points to 41 percent.  In 
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2002 participation in migrant employment was distributed fairly evenly across most 
income deciles, but by 2007 migrant participation was disproportionately 
concentrated in middle-income groups.  The share of wages from migration in total 
household income (Figure 5.3) shows a similar pattern.  Thus in 2007 migrant 
employment and earnings were especially important to middle-income rural 
households.     
[insert Figures 5.2 and 5.3 about here] 
Participation in migrant employment differed markedly across provinces (Table 
5.11).  In 2007 provincial participation rates ranged from a low of 13 percent in 
Zhejiang to a high of 63 percent in Hubei, Chongqing, and Sichuan.  Changes over 
time also differed among the provinces.  Participation in migration rose sharply in 
Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Gansu, but declined in 
Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Yunnan. 
[insert Table 5.11 about here] 
Lagging participation by the poorer deciles, as shown in the above figures, raises 
questions about whether migration contributed to a reduction in poverty.  Analyzing 
the contribution of migration to poverty reduction is difficult, as migration has 
multiple direct and indirect effects on income (Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Division 2009).  Also, poor households may be less able to migrate due 
to a lack of resources and networks, thereby rendering the relationship between 
migration and poverty bidirectional (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Division 2009).   
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 Nevertheless, some simple statistics in Table 5.12 provide an indication of the 
relationship between migration and poverty.3  In 2002 the poverty rates for 
individuals in migrant and non-migrant households were similar—about 26-28 
percent.  In other words, individuals living in households without migrant earnings 
were no more likely to be poor than those living in households with migrant earnings.  
Moreover, the share of poor living in households without migrant earnings was 
similar to the share of the total rural population in such households.  
[insert Table 5.12 about here] 
By 2007 poverty rates had declined for households both with and without migrant 
earnings, but more so for households with migrant earnings.  Consequently, in 2007 
the poverty rate for migrant households was lower than that for non-migrant 
households; also, a larger share of the poor—nearly two-thirds—was living in 
households without migrant earnings.  These statistics are consistent with a scenario 
in which migration contributed to poverty reduction and those who remained below 
the poverty line in 2007 were disproportionately in households that did not have 
migrant income.  Thus the relationship between migration and poverty has 
apparently changed over time. 
VII. The Elimination of Taxes and Fees 
In 2005 the Chinese government announced the abolition of agricultural taxes, 
effective January 1, 2006 (Xinhua 2005).  This announcement was the final step in 
the “rural tax-and-fee reforms” that were initiated in the 1990s.  As discussed in Sato, 
Li, and Yue (2008), since 2000 the Chinese government has carried out a 
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comprehensive reform of agricultural taxes and fees.  During the first phase of this 
reform (2000 to 2003), informal local levies were replaced by formal taxation 
(feigaishui).  During the second phase (2004 to 2006), as part of its goal of 
eliminating agricultural taxes, the government implemented a program of gradual tax 
reductions and experimented with the full abolition of agricultural taxes in some 
regions (Sato, Li, and Yue 2008; Xinhua 2005).  As of January 1, 2006, the abolition 
of agricultural taxes was to be completed nationwide.          
 Using earlier rounds of the CHIP rural data, Sato, Li, and Yue (2008) analyze the 
distributional effects of the tax-and-fee reforms through 2002.  Here we examine the 
changes between 2002 and 2007.  In 2002 the tax-and-fee reforms were ongoing, 
with implementation varying regionally.  In 2007 agricultural taxes and fees had 
been eliminated nationwide, at least in principle.  The 2007 CHIP data allow us to 
verify whether or not, from the perspective of rural households, this goal was 
achieved.    
 As discussed in Sato, Li, and Yue (2008), rural households in China have paid a 
variety of taxes and fees. The CHIP rural data for 2007 contain a single “total” value 
of taxes and fees paid by the household, including both formal taxes paid to the state 
as well as levies and fees collected by the village and township.  We do not have 
information on the composition of this total.  Also, the reported taxes and fees do not 
include contributions of unpaid labor.  Historically, an important component of rural 
taxation was in-kind taxation in the form of contributions of unpaid labor.  This form 
of taxation was also eliminated as part of the rural tax reforms.  We cannot examine 
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it here due to lack of data for 2007, but the 2002 CHIP data indicate that this form of 
taxation had already been substantially reduced by 2002, at which time only 28 
percent of the rural households reported contributing unpaid labor, and the mean 
unpaid labor contribution was less than two days.  
Table 5.13 shows the level of taxes and fees reported by households in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of income.  Rural taxes and fees declined markedly in both 
absolute terms and relative to income.  Indeed, as of 2007 taxes and fees took a 
trivial fraction of rural household incomes.  These data indicate that the 
government’s goal of abolishing taxes and fees was effectively accomplished. 
 In 2002 taxes and fees were distributed regressively, as revealed in the higher tax 
rates for households in the lower deciles (Table 5.13).  In 2007 the tax rate for the 
bottom two deciles was higher than that for the higher deciles, but for all deciles the 
tax rates were well below 1 percent.  This pattern suggests that the abolition of 
agricultural taxes and fees was equalizing, although given the relatively low level of 
taxes in 2002, the net impact on income inequality may not have been very large.  
Indeed, in 2002 inequality of after-tax income was higher than that of before-tax 
income (0.354 versus 0.338).  In 2007 the Gini coefficients of before- and after-tax 
incomes were identical (0.358).  (See Table 5.3.) 
[insert Table 5.13 about here] 
Table 5.14, which shows taxes and fees paid by the poor versus those paid by the 
non-poor, reveals the differential impact of taxes and fees for those in the lowest 
income groups.  In 2002 taxes and fees accounted for 5 to 7 percent of the before-tax 
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income of the poor, more than double the tax rate for the non-poor.   
[insert Table 5.14 about here] 
The average amount of taxes and fees paid by the poor in 2002 was large enough 
to account for a significant share of the poverty gap.  As shown in Table 5.15, in 
2002 the average poverty gap, measured using the PPP$1.25 per day poverty line, was 
442 yuan; on average those who fell below this poverty line paid 63 yuan in taxes and 
fees, i.e., taxes and fees were equivalent to 14 percent of the poverty gap.  Using the 
other poverty lines, we find that taxes and fees were equivalent to larger percentages 
of the poverty gap.  For example, on average in 2002 taxes and fees paid by 
households below the official poverty line were equivalent to nearly one-quarter of 
the average poverty gap. 
[insert Table 5.15 about here] 
By 2007 the average amount of taxes and fees paid by the poor was much lower, 
both in absolute terms and relative to the poverty gap.  These statistics suggest that 
the abolition of rural taxes and fees was beneficial to the poor.  However, some 
observers have noted that the abolition of rural taxes and fees may have had negative 
indirect effects on the poor, as it resulted in a loss of revenue for local governments 
and thereby negatively affected their ability to fund social welfare programs, such as 
the dibao program (Zhang and Sun 2009). 
 
VIII. The Minimum Living Guarantee 
A significant component of the government’s new rural policy program was the 
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minimum living guarantee, or dibao, program.  The government initiated the dibao 
program in urban areas in the early 1990s, and local experiments with rural dibao 
programs began not much later, largely in the more developed areas (Xu and Zhang 
2010).  By 2001 rural programs were quite widespread, but at that time they were 
locally funded and varied considerably in levels of support and criteria for eligibility, 
and many difficulties in implementation arose after the reform of rural taxes and fees, 
which reduced local revenue (Xu and Zhang 2010).   
 After 2004, the rural dibao program was enlarged, especially during and after 
2006.  By the end of 2006 roughly 80 percent of the provinces and counties in China 
had adopted rural dibao programs (Xu and Zhang 2010).  In early 2007 the central 
government announced that it would provide central subsidies for the program and 
that by the end of that year the program would be implemented nationwide in all 
counties (Xinhua 2007a, 2007b; Xu and Zhang 2010).  According to official 
statistics, in 2007 35.7 million rural individuals (4.9 percent of the rural population) 
received relief under the dibao program, up from 4 million (0.5 percent) in 2002 
(Department of Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the NBS 2008, p. 330; 
NBS 2009, pp. 89, 939).   
The dibao program was expected to absorb or complement several previous 
programs that had provided subsidies for poor households, including the 
five-guarantee (wubao) program and subsidies for destitute households (tekun jiuzhu).  
The tekun program, which has provided targeted assistance to households that lacked 
labor due to age, illness, or death, was gradually to be absorbed, where and when 
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local fiscal capacity and funding from higher levels made it possible to implement the 
more comprehensive dibao program (Xu and Zhang 2010). The five-guarantee 
program in principle has been separate from and complementary to the dibao program, 
although the distinction between the two programs is not always clear at the local 
level.4  By 2007 the dibao program was by far China’s broadest nationwide rural 
social relief program, accounting for three-quarters of the rural recipients of social 
relief, followed in a far second place by the five-guarantee program which covered 5 
million recipients (Department of Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the 
NBS 2008, p. 330).   
 In 2007 the average dibao threshold was 70 yuan per person per month (840 yuan 
per person per year), an amount slightly higher than the official poverty line that year 
(785 yuan).  In that year, the average spending per recipient under the dibao program 
was 466 yuan (Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008; Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Division 2009; Xinhua 2007b; Zhang and Sun 2009), an amount close to 
the average poverty gap (Table 5.15).  In principle, then, the dibao program had the 
potential to substantially alleviate poverty if it was well implemented and effectively 
targeted. 
[insert Table 5.16 about here] 
Table 5.16 presents statistics on dibao households in the CHIP rural survey.  In 
2007, the prevalence (weighted) of rural individuals in dibao households nationally 
was 2.5 percent.5  This percentage is lower than the percentage of the rural 
population receiving dibao subsidies as reported by the NBS (4.9 percent).   
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 The lower percentage of dibao households reported in the CHIP rural household 
survey may be due to an under-sampling of poor households, a known feature of the 
NBS household survey samples from which the CHIP survey is drawn.  It could also 
reflect misreporting.  Participating households may have been unaware that they 
were receiving transfers under the dibao program, as opposed to some other programs 
such as the five-guarantee household program.  It is also possible that the official 
statistics are misreported.  Local-level governments in China have been known to 
overstate their implementation of central government policies. 
 Table 5.16 also shows the differences between dibao and non-dibao households.  
Income per capita is lower in dibao households than in non-dibao households, but at 
3029 yuan per year it is still substantially higher than the national poverty line as well 
as the national average dibao threshold.   
The CHIP questionnaire did not ask about the amount of dibao subsidies received 
by the households, but in principle dibao subsidies would be counted as transfer 
income.  As shown in Table 5.16, net transfer income for dibao and non-dibao 
households in the CHIP survey is similar, although this may be due to the fact that 
non-dibao households received larger private transfers. 
 If we assume that the average dibao subsidies were equal to the average monthly 
expenditure per capita on the dibao program in 2007, then the annual dibao subsidies 
would have been equivalent to 15 percent of the per capita income of dibao 
households.  This amount is larger than their average reported net transfer income, 
which in 2007 was only 7.2 percent of per capita income.  Such a discrepancy might 
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arise if dibao expenditures reported by the Ministry of Civil Affairs overstate the 
subsidy amounts actually received by households, or if transfer income in the CHIP 
survey does not fully reflect the dibao transfers.  In many areas village leaders are 
responsible for implementation of the dibao program and slippage is possible at the 
ground level. 
 Dibao participation rates vary substantially among provinces, as shown in Figure 
5.4 for the provinces covered in the 2007 CHIP rural survey.  The dibao participation 
rate is by far the highest in Yunnan, where almost one out of ten individuals resides in 
a dibao household.  The lowest participation rate is Beijing.  This regional variation 
is not surprising given the differing poverty rates and also the variations in 
implementation of the dibao program, which is largely dependent on local fiscal 
resources plus some central supplements in regions that face fiscal difficulties.  It has 
been reported that income thresholds and subsidies vary among regions and generally 
are lower in poor localities (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division 
2009; Xinhua 2007a). 
[insert Figure 5.4 around here] 
Does the dibao program effectively target the poor?  The CHIP data suggest that 
the dibao glass is half full: individuals in poor households benefited more than those 
in non-poor households, but there was leakage.  As shown in Table 5.17, in 2007 
between 15 and 45 percent of individuals in dibao households were poor, depending 
on the poverty line.  The poverty rates for non-dibao households were substantially 
lower.  Also, a much higher share of the poor than of the non-poor lived in dibao 
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households.     
[insert Table 5.17 about here] 
The share of the poor receiving dibao benefits was well below 10 percent for all 
four poverty lines.6  In other words, the overwhelming majority of the poor—more 
than 90 percent—lived in households that did not receive dibao subsidies.  Also, 
even for our highest poverty line, more than half of the dibao households were not 
poor.  These statistics together with some reports about irregularities in 
implementation of the program at the local level (Deng and Wong 2008; Lin and 
Wong 2012) suggest that there is substantial room for improvement in implementation 
of the rural dibao program. 
IX. Conclusions 
In this chapter we use the CHIP rural survey data to examine changes in rural 
household incomes and inequality between 2002 and 2007, a period of renewed 
emphasis on rural policy.  Overall, between 2002 and 2007 conditions improved for 
rural households, reversing trends in the late 1990s through the 2000s.  We find that 
rural incomes grew substantially and more rapidly than during the preceding period.  
The fact that the urban-rural income gap continued to widen thus was not due to 
stagnation in rural incomes, but rather to the more rapid growth in urban incomes. 
 Income growth was the result of increases in income from multiple sources, 
including agriculture as well as off-farm employment and other sources.  Growth 
was most rapid in asset income, although this source of income remained small in the 
rural areas.  Imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing also increased 
 
 
365
rapidly.  By 2007 these two sources of income together constituted more than 10 
percent of rural household income, reflecting the rising importance of property 
income in rural China. 
 Income from migrant employment, narrowly defined as wages earned by rural 
household members from migrant jobs, also increased rapidly.  Indeed, by 2007 such 
income accounted for nearly one-fifth of per capita income in the rural areas, 
approaching the amount of income from local wage employment.  These trends 
suggest that the easing of restrictions on labor movement was beneficial for rural 
households.  The importance of migrant income would have been even greater if our 
calculations had included remittances from migrant family members, not to mention 
income of former rural households that had relocated.   
Despite growth in nonagricultural forms of income, agriculture retained its place 
as the largest single source of income for rural households.  Agricultural income 
grew at a fairly rapid pace, likely reflecting the recovery of farm prices and 
technological improvements, as well as new policies supporting agriculture. 
  Rural income growth was fairly widely shared, so that inequality increased only 
slightly between 2002 and 2007.  Stable inequality was partly due to the growth in 
migrant wage earnings as well as to the growth in agricultural income, both of which 
were relatively equally distributed.  As measured using the absolute poverty lines, 
the poverty headcount rate and the poverty gap declined substantially.  Yet, although 
income growth among the poor was sufficient to raise roughly one-half of the poor 
from absolute poverty, among those who remained poor the severity of their poverty 
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increased.  Also, relative poverty showed no improvement.  Income growth in the 
low-income groups was thus insufficient to catch up with the median incomes.      
 Using the CHIP data we explored the impact of the elimination of rural taxes and 
fees.  The data reveal the near-elimination of tax and fee payments by rural 
households.  As taxes and fees were regressive in 2002, their elimination reduced the 
inequality, but because the level of taxes and fees was already low in 2002, the size of 
this impact was small.  We also note that rural taxes and fees had been a source of 
local public revenues; thus, their near-abolition may have had negative consequences 
on local public spending that, in turn, affected rural households.  These indirect 
effects are not captured by our calculations.   
Our analysis of the dibao subsidies raises questions about the effectiveness of the 
minimum living guarantee program and its impact on poverty reduction, at least as of 
2007.  Although the program was more beneficial to the poor than to the non-poor, 
we find that the overwhelming majority of the poor lived in households that did not 
report receiving dibao subsidies.  Discrepancies between dibao numbers based on 
the CHIP rural survey data and those in official reports raise questions and suggest the 
need for additional research. 
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Figure 5.1 Average Annual Income Growth from 2002 to 2007 for Five Percentile 
Groups in the Distribution of Income 
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Note: Growth rates for each decile are calculated as , where 
2002 and 2007 denote the two years, and p denotes the percentile group. Growth is 
calculated using constant 2002 prices, with weights, and using the CHIP income 
definition.   
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Figure 5.2 Growth in Migrant Employment of Rural Labor 
 
 
Notes:  Sheng (2008).  This source estimates the level of migration using data from 
the NBS rural household survey.  Migrants are defined as members of rural 
households who receive migrant wage employment.  The labor force is defined as 
the number of members of rural households of working age. 
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Figure 5.3 Percentage of Households Reporting Wage Earnings from Migrant 
Employment, by Decile 
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Figure 5.4 Wage Earnings from Migration as a Percentage of Household Per Capita 
Income, by Decile 
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Figure 5.5 Percentage of Individuals in Rural Dibao Households, 2007, by Province 
 
 
Note:  Unweighted.  
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Table 5.1. Rural per capita household incomes, 2002 and 2007 
 
 
2002 
(yuan)
2007 
(yuan)
Average annual 
growth 
(%, constant 
prices) 
CHIP Rural Survey Data    
NBS income definition 2590 4221 6.96 
CHIP income definition 2771 4617 7.44 
Published NBS Statistics 2476 4140 7.51 
Notes:  All mean incomes are in current prices.  CHIP incomes are calculated with 
weights, and average annual growth is calculated using constant prices deflated using 
the NBS rural consumer price index.  The published NBS income statistics and rural 
consumer price index are from NBS (2008). 
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Table 5.2. Rural household per capita income, by source 
 
2002 2007 
Average 
annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
Increment 
(constant 
2002 
yuan) 
Share of 
increment 
(%) Yuan 
Share 
of 
income 
(%) 
Yuan 
Share of 
income 
(%) 
Wage earnings from 
migrant employment 
314 11.3 816 17.7 17.4 387  32.3  
Wage earnings from 
local employment 
678 24.5 929 20.1 3.3 121  10.1  
Net income from 
agriculture 
1099 39.7 1686 36.5 5.7 349  29.2  
Net income from 
nonagricultural 
businesses 
363 13.1 471 10.2 2.2 42  3.5  
Net transfer income  117 4.2 197 4.3 7.7 52  4.4  
Asset income 19 0.7 121 2.6 40.9 85  7.1  
Imputed rent on 
owner-occupied 
housing 
181 6.5 397 8.6 13.5 160  13.4  
TOTAL 2771 100.0 4618 100.0 7.4 1195  100.0 
Note:  Weighted.  Mean income levels for 2002 and 2007 are in current prices; 
income growth and income increments are in constant 2002 prices.  Numbers may 
not match exactly due to rounding. 
 
 
 
378
 
 
Table 5.3. Estimates of the rural Gini coefficient, 2002 and 2007 
 
 Not PPP PPP 
 2002 2007 % change 2002 2007 
% 
change 
CHIP Rural Survey Data       
NBS income definition 0.358 0.363 1.4 0.356 0.364 2.2 
CHIP income definition 0.354 0.358 1.1 0.352 0.357 1.4 
Published NBS Statistics 0.365 0.374 2.5    
Notes:  The CHIP data are weighted.  The PPP estimates correct for provincial 
differences in cost of living using the Brandt and Holz (2006) price indices updated to 
2007 using the NBS provincial-level rural consumer price indices.  The NBS 
published Gini coefficients are based on the NBS rural household surveys and can be 
found in Department of Rural Surveys (2010, p. 46, Table 2-26).   
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Table 5.4. Alternate measures of inequality 
 
 2002 2007 % change 
Coefficient of Variation 0.8039 0.8134 1.18 
Theil index (GE(a), a = 1) 0.2258 0.2260 0.09 
Mean Log Deviation (GE(a), a = 0) 0.2129 0.2165 1.69 
    
Income ratio of top 20% to bottom 20% 6.09 6.39 4.93 
Income ratio of top 10% to bottom 10% 10.02 11.11 10.88 
Income ratio of top 5% to bottom 5% 15.87 19.89 25.33 
Note:  Calculated with weights and using the CHIP income definition. 
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Table 5.5. Gini coefficient decomposition, by income source 
 
Income source 
Percentage of 
Income 
Gini Relative 
Concentration 
Coefficient (ck) 
Percentage of Gini
Contributed  
(sk x 100) 
2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Wage earnings from migrant employment 11.3 17.7 0.81 0.82 9.2 14.5 
Wage earnings from local employment 24.5 20.1 1.43 1.29 34.9 25.9 
Net income from agriculture 39.7 36.5 0.58 0.71 22.9 26.0 
Net income from nonagricultural business 13.1 10.2 1.58 1.66 20.7 16.9 
Net transfer income 0.7 2.6 2.04 1.69 1.4 4.4 
Asset income 4.2 4.3 1.16 1.00 4.9 4.3 
Imputed rent on owner-occupied housing 6.5 8.6 0.91 0.93 6.0 8.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 1.00 1.00 100.0 100.0 
Note:  Calculated with weights and using the CHIP income definition. 
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Table 5.6. Poverty lines 
 
 2002 2007 
 Amount 
(yuan) 
Share of 
mean 
income (%) 
Amount 
(yuan) 
Share of 
mean 
income (%) 
PPP$1.25 per day per person 1451 56.0 1689 40.0 
Official poverty line  964 37.2 1123 26.6 
0.5*median income 1051 40.6 1714 40.6 
0.6*median income 1261 48.7 2057 48.7 
Note:  All poverty lines are expressed in terms of income per capita.  Median and 
mean incomes are calculated using the weighted CHIP rural sample incomes and the 
NBS income definition, which does not include imputed rent from owner-occupied 
housing. 
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Table 5.7. Poverty estimates 
 
 2002 2007 
Poverty 
headcount 
(%) 
Poverty 
gap 
(%) 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
Poverty 
headcount 
(%) 
Poverty 
gap 
(%) 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
PPP$1.25 per day 27.48 8.37 3.72 13.88 4.65 5.04 
Official poverty line  11.22 2.97 1.27 5.59 2.25 7.09 
0.5*median income 13.69 3.75 1.60 14.32 4.79 5.03 
0.6*median income 20.75 5.99 2.59 21.07 6.93 5.28 
Note:  The poverty headcount FGT(0) measures the incidence of poverty; the 
poverty gap FGT(1) measures the depth of poverty; the squared poverty gap FGT(2) 
measures the severity of poverty (Ravallion 1994).  Calculated using the poverty 
lines shown in Table 5.6, the weighted CHIP rural sample incomes, and the NBS 
income definition, which excludes imputed rent from owner-occupied housing. 
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Table 5.8. Decomposition of changes in poverty, 2002-2007 
 
 PPP$1.25 per day Official poverty line 
 Poverty headcount 
Poverty 
gap 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
Poverty 
headcount 
Poverty 
gap 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
Change in poverty (%) -13.60 -3.72 1.32 -5.64 -0.72 5.82 
Of which:  (percentage points) 
Growth -14.10 -4.66 -1.55 -6.61 -1.80 0.61 
Redistribution 0.50 0.94 2.87 0.97 1.07 5.21 
Note:  Calculated using the Shorrocks (1999) method, with weights, and using the 
NBS income definition (excluding imputed rental income from owner-occupied 
housing).  The calculation uses constant prices. 
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Table 5.9. Per capita income and its composition for non-poor and poor households 
 
 
2002 2007 
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor 
mean % mean % mean % mean % 
Wage earnings from 
migrant employment 382 12.0 138 13.6 918 19.4 186 16.6 
Wage earnings from 
local employment 875 27.4 157 15.6 1048 22.2 191 17.0 
Net income from 
agriculture 1281 40.2 620 61.4 1861 39.4 605 53.8 
Net income from 
nonagricultural 
businesses 
481 15.1 51 5.1 541 11.5 33 2.9 
Net transfer income 146 4.6 42 4.1 216 4.6 79 7.0 
Asset income 25 0.8 1 0.1 136 2.9 29 2.6 
TOTAL 3189 100.0 1009 100.0 4720 100.0 1124 100.0 
Note:  Calculated using the PPP$1.25 per day poverty line, in current prices, 
weighted, and with the NBS income definition.   
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Table 5.10. Composition of the income difference between non-poor and poor 
households 
 
 
2002 2007 
yuan % yuan % 
Wage earnings from migrant employment 244 11.2 731 20.3 
Wage earnings from local employment 718 32.9 857 23.8 
Net income from agriculture 661 30.3 1256 34.9 
Net income from nonagricultural businesses 429 19.7 508 14.1 
Net transfer income 104 4.8 137 3.8 
Asset income 24 1.1 107 3.0 
TOTAL 2180 100.0 3597 100.0 
Note:  Calculated as the absolute gap between the mean incomes of the non-poor and 
the poor, as shown in Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.11. Percentage of households in each province of the CHIP rural survey 
reporting wage earnings from migrant employment 
 
Province 2002 2007 
Beijing 24.38 24.00 
Hebei 13.78 32.40 
Shanxi 6.50 15.00 
Liaoning 27.78 23.00 
Jilin 11.46 - 
Jiangsu 36.82 41.90 
Zhejiang 29.04 12.60 
Anhui 60.00 56.22 
Fujian - 29.00 
Jiangxi 57.44 - 
Shandong 18.57 - 
Henan 34.34 48.20 
Hubei 30.19 62.60 
Hunan 43.11 56.13 
Guangdong 45.66 50.50 
Guangxi 49.25 - 
Chongqing 38.50 63.20 
Sichuan 44.60 63.09 
Guizhou 44.75 - 
Yunnan 21.54 16.14 
Shaanxi 36.22 - 
Gansu 31.56 48.86 
Xinjiang 13.00  
Total 32.95 41.39 
Note:  The provincial percentages are not weighted; the totals are weighted using 
household-level weights. 
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Table 5.12. The relationship between migration and poverty 
 
Type of household Share of rural population (%) 
Poverty headcount 
(%) 
Share of poor rural 
population (%) 
2002 
No migrant workers 63.7 28.3 65.6 
With migrant workers 36.3 26.1 34.4 
2007 
No migrant workers 51.6 16.6 61.6 
With migrant workers 48.4 11.0 38.4 
Note:  Migration is identified by whether the household reports wage earnings from 
migrant employment.  Poverty is calculated using the PPP$1.25 per day poverty line.  
Weighted; poverty calculations use the NBS income definition.  
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Table 5.13. Taxes and fees paid by rural households (per capita), by deciles 
 
 Taxes and fees  (yuan) 
Before-tax income 
per capita (yuan) Tax rate (%) 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Bottom 56.95 4.71 818.07 1139.19 6.96 0.41 
2nd 63.46 8.32 1247.84 1965.69 5.09 0.42 
3rd 71.51 5.96 1557.85 2487.20 4.59 0.24 
4th 79.10 10.79 1850.56 2979.16 4.27 0.36 
5th 81.68 10.45 2163.22 3491.65 3.78 0.30 
6th 81.88 11.24 2496.71 4042.76 3.28 0.28 
7th 87.95 9.48 2894.85 4718.90 3.04 0.20 
8th 86.11 15.92 3437.63 5670.42 2.50 0.28 
9th 91.30 17.61 4323.02 7171.74 2.11 0.25 
top 121.32 33.80 7747.05 12642.26 1.57 0.27 
Average 82.12 12.83 2853.21 4630.41 2.88 0.28 
Note:  The tax rate is equal to per capita taxes and fees divided by household per 
capita net before-tax income.  In current prices, calculated with weights and using 
the CHIP income definition plus taxes, so that the tax rates are percentages of the 
before-tax income. 
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Table 5.14. Taxes and fees paid by poor and non-poor households (per capita) 
 
 
2002 2007 
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor 
 Yuan Tax rate (%) Yuan
Tax rate 
(%) Yuan
Tax rate 
(%) Yuan 
Tax rate 
(%) 
PPP$1.25 per day 89 2.56  62 5.36  14 0.27 5 0.40  
Official poverty line  85 2.73  60 7.00  13 0.27 6 0.63  
0.5*median income 85 2.71  61 6.63  14 0.27 5 0.38  
0.6*median income 87 2.63  62 5.88  15 0.27 5 0.32  
Note:  See the notes to Table 5.13.  Households are grouped as poor or non-poor 
using the NBS income definition (excluding imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing).  The tax rate is calculated as a percentage of the before-tax income, 
calculated as CHIP income plus taxes.  Note that the 2007 tax rates for the non-poor 
in fact are slightly different, but all round to the same value. 
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Table 5.15. Taxes and fees paid by the poor relative to the poverty gap 
 
 
Average 
Poverty Gap 
Per Capita 
(yuan) 
Average Taxes 
and Fees Per 
Capita 
(yuan) 
Taxes and Fees 
as a % of the 
Poverty Gap 
2002 
PPP$1.25 per day 441.74 62.88 14.23 
Official poverty line  255.64 60.29 23.58 
0.5*median income 287.58 60.93 21.19 
0.6*median income 363.79 62.09 17.07 
2007 
PPP$1.25 per day 565.70 5.41 0.96 
Official poverty line  452.55 5.77 1.27 
0.5*median income 572.93 5.28 0.92 
0.6*median income 676.69 5.20 0.77 
Note:  In current prices. Calculated with weights and using the NBS definition of 
income. 
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Table 5.16. Basic statistics on individuals in dibao vs. non-dibao households, from the 
CHIP Rural Household Survey, 2007 
 
 Dibao non-Dibao 
Percentage of individuals (%) 2.46 97.54 
Income per capita (yuan) 3029 4658 
Net transfer income per capita (yuan) 197 217 
Net transfer income per capita, as a share of 
the total income per capita (%) 7.2 4.2 
Estimated dibao subsidy per capita, as a share 
of the average household income per capita 
(%) 
15.4 0 
Note: Based on the reported national average expenditures of 38.8 yuan per person per 
month in 2007 the annual dibao subsidy per capita for dibao households is estimated 
to be 466 yuan (Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). Non-dibao households are assumed 
to receive zero dibao subsidies. Weighted; CHIP income definition.   
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Table 5.17. The relationship between dibao participation and poverty, 2007 
 
 Poverty rate of individuals in 
non-dibao versus dibao 
households (%) 
% of non-poor and poor 
individuals living in dibao  
households 
 non dibao dibao non-poor poor 
PPP$1.25 per day per person 13.30 37.05 1.80 6.56 
Official poverty line  5.34 15.31 2.21 6.74 
0.5*median income 13.73 37.64 1.79 6.47 
0.6*median income 20.46 45.63 1.69 5.33 
Note:  Weighted.  Poverty is calculated using the NBS definition of income. 
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1  See the Appendix to this volume for additional explanations of the weights. 
 
2  For example, F(Y) = (f(y1 ),.., f(yn )),where f(yi ) equals the rank of yi divided by 
the number of observations n. 
 
3 We adapt this table from Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division 
(2009, p. 102, Table 5.51), which provides the same statistics for 2003. 
 
4 Personal communication from the World Bank. 
 
5 The CHIP rural household survey included a question asking households if they 
participated in the dibao program.  The percentages reported here are calculated as 
the total number of individuals in dibao households divided by the total number of 
individuals in all households.   
 
6 We note that our percentages of poor households participating in the dibao program 
are very different from those reported by official sources.  Government 
announcements in 2007 reported that 70 percent or more of China’s rural poor 
benefited from the dibao program (Xinhua 2007a, 2007b).  The reason for this large 
discrepancy is unclear. 
